SCS Lafferty

NOTICE OF OUTCOME OF PUBLIC HEARING

I have determined that an outcome notice in relation to the misconduct hearing of the below named officer will be published              

Legally Qualified Chair: David Sapiecha                            ​ 

Date of Hearing: 5^th July 2023

Officer: Former SPS Victor Lafferty

IN THE MATTER OF A MISCONDUCT HEARING 

POLICE (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020

BETWEEN:

THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY

(Chief Constable Devon and Cornwall Police).

-v-

SPECIAL CONSTABULARY SEARGEANT VICTOR LAFFERTY

DECISION OF PANEL

1 Special Sergeant (SS) Lafferty has resigned his position within the Special Constabulary of Devon and Cornwall Police. Nonetheless the panel approaches the matter as if he were still a serving member of the police. The fact of his resignation is a matter irrelevant to our considerations at this stage of the proceedings and SS Lafferty’s position is not to be prejudiced as a result of his resignation. The Regulations apply equally to members of the special constabulary as they do to any salaried police officer.

2 The former officer faces 4 allegations fully set out in the Regulation 30^[1] Notice at pages 3-5 in the bundle provided.

3 The officer has not attended the hearing nor is he represented. It has not been suggested on his behalf that any of the witnesses identified within the bundle should be required to give live evidence. The panel has considered the whole contents of the bundle. We have in mind that SS Lafferty should not be prejudiced in his case by his non- attendance at the hearing.

4 SS Lafferty’s account is contained within his Regulation 31 Response^[2], summary of his interview^[3] under caution on 10^th May 2021 and emails dated 23^rd and 27^th May 2022 to Mike Phillips.^[4] The Whatsapp message referred to is at P204 of the bundle.

5 APPROACH:

The Panel has approached its task by:

First deciding the facts.

Second determining if any professional standards have been breached and if so,

thirdly deciding at what level we assess those breaches.

5.1 We have applied the following principles:

1. i) The burden of proving any allegation rests with the Appropriate Authority. The standard by which they are required to prove any allegation is on the balance of probabilities (the appropriate standard). It is not for the officer to prove anything, let alone his innocence from misconduct.
2. ii) The panel do not have to decide every matter of dispute, only those which assist us with our decision as to whether, or not a particular allegation is proved.
3. iii) We can draw inferences from the evidence adduced to us, meaning we can reach common sense conclusions, but we must not speculate. Any conclusions must be reached fairly.
4. iv) There is evidence of positive good character which we have taken into account in the following ways:
5. a) Weighing it in SS Lafferty’s favour when considering the credibility of any accounts he has provided.
6. b) It means he is less likely to misconduct himself in the way alleged.

That balancing exercise must also include the fact that SS Lafferty has made a number of admissions pertinent to the allegations.

6 ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED:

Allegation 1.

SS Lafferty accessed force systems namely STORM via his PDA between 01/06/2021 and

07/04/2022 and viewed up to 1208 STORM logs on days whilst off duty for a non-policing purpose in contravention of the Force Data Protection Policy.

6.1 Evidence:

At pages 44-54 of the bundle is a spreadsheet of SS Lafferty’s access to storm logs, summarising the data at pages 64 -175, which has had personal details redacted for the purposes of the hearing but an unredacted example has been provided to the panel. It is said he did not have a policing purpose to justifying his actions. SS Lafferty accepts accessing force systems, but says he was never told not to on his PDA^[5]. He states that he would monitor the potential need for special constabulary resources and to keep up with what was happening within D&C Force (area). During his interview under caution ^[6]SS Lafferty said that viewing the logs never caused him to go in (to the station). He agreed he looked at the logs for personal curiosity and not for a policing purpose. It was pointed out to SS Lafferty that during the 5 month period when he accessed 778 logs he was only on duty 19 times of which 10 were for administrative duties. This latter point further suggests that the accesses were not for policing purposes. SS Lafferty criticises the PDA course he undertook at Launceston police station. However, the allegation is that he should not have been accessing logs without a policing purpose through any medium. It is the general Data Protection position which is important.

6.2 The panel is satisfied that SS Lafferty,

1. i) Accessed the force system ‘STORM’ logs as alleged.
2. ii) That he did so at times when he was off duty. (The relevance of this the panel considers is as a further indicator that there was no legitimate policing purpose for the access).
3. iii) That SS Lafferty did not have a legitimate policing purpose for the accesses (or at least the vast majority of them). He was most likely viewing logs out of curiosity and/or personal interest. The number and variety of incidents over a long period of time including matters clearly not related to SS Lafferty’s  role are strong indicators that the accesses were not for policing purposes. Added to that is the fact that these were carried out when off duty and did not trigger an immediate return to duty nor seemingly ever positively acted on in a professional capacity by the officer.
4. iv) The activity was contrary to the D&C Force Data Policy. Throughout and in particular Para 3.6.1 (at page 249):

“…Access and use of such information by Individuals described in 1.2.2 must only be in the course of their official duties or role. Use for any other purpose is prohibited and may result in criminal and disciplinary proceedings”.

6.3 Consequently, this allegation against SS Lafferty is proved.

6.4  The IO suggested that there was a degree of prevalence of log surfing in the special constabulary hence, the email of 14/4/22 (post these events) at page 209.

“…From what I have found so far is that there appears to be a prevailing problem of possible misuse of the devices in the manner described by significant numbers of Special Constabulary officers. Whilst it may appear to be done with the best of intentions at heart of keeping up to date with what is going on in an officers (sic) area it is none the less accessing confidential data whilst off duty without any defining or immediate Policing Purpose…”

6.5  In any event SS Lafferty was an experienced long serving officer. It is required of officers that they make themselves aware of and adhere to force policies. Data protection is not a latent issue in any industry and its main principles relating to confidentiality are common knowledge to the public at large. It must have been obvious to SS Lafferty in his position that he should not have been accessing these logs. As to the clarity of training received by SS Lafferty; Tracey Wheeler states that SS Lafferty attended the PNC for MDT course at Launceston and that the course did not specifically cover Data Protection but that there were questions posed about Data Protection^[7]. There is produced a course handout for ‘PNC Vehicle and Nominal Enquiry for Mobile Data’. Whilst PNC was the specific subject, Data Protection in respect of all force systems is the umbrella principle involved in this training. Added to this is the evidence of Data Protection Training courses highlighted at page 185 of the bundle which SS Lafferty attended and passed. The panel sought and has been provided with 2 pages from training course (P255 and 256) which again reinforces that SS Lafferty was sufficiently trained in Data protection policies.  Further, the panel is aware that on accessing force systems there are warnings given to the user as to the need to be aware of and adhere to force data protection policies. The panel is satisfied that SS Lafferty would have known the legitimate limits of accessing force data systems.

6.6  Allegation 2

SS Lafferty viewed log 800 07/11/21 on 08/11/2021 which relates to an incident at a public house where your family and you have an interest in the running and management. This is in contravention of the Force Data Protection Policy.

6.7  The relevant access is evidenced at Page 53 of the bundle and highlighted in red.

 SS Lafferty does not dispute he accessed this information via STORM and it related to ‘his son’s pub’. In his Regulation 31 Response, he states he did not view it because of the familial connection^[8], he has never acted on the information, nor disclosed it. However, in his interview under caution (P199) it says:

“ He looked at the log because it involved the (name of pub unredacted)”.

6.8  The panel are satisfied that:

SS Lafferty accessed the relevant log which related to licensed premises in which SS Lafferty had a personal interest, directly and through family members.

The access was contrary to force data protection policy including para 3.6.3^[9] which does not provide an exhaustive list but clearly does and is intended to cover this sort of situation.

6.9  The allegation is found to be proved.

6.10 The same points with regard to SS Lafferty’s training and knowledge have relevance here.

6.11    Allegation 3

SS Lafferty accessed force systems namely STORM via his PDA between 01/06/2021 and

07/04/2022 whilst on duty not for a policing purpose and viewed up to 80 logs in

contravention of the Force Data Protection Policy.

6.12    The panel find that SS Lafferty:

1. i) Accessed the logs, or at least the vast majority, as evidenced in the bundle (176-182).
2. ii) At a time when on duty.
3. iii) He did so not for a legitimate policing purpose, but likely out of curiosity and/or personal interest. This is an extension of the same sort of activity as found proved in allegation 1 for the same reasons save, he was not off duty at these times.
4. iii) The activity was contrary to the D&C Force Data Policy. Throughout and in particular Para 3.6.1 (at page 249).

6.13    This allegation is proved;

6.14    Allegation 4

SS Lafferty accessed logs on the 12/08/21 from the Plymouth area, despite being based in the

St Austell area and having no reason or policing purpose for doing so. After viewing

other ‘violence’ tagged logs in various Plymouth locations, he then accessed Log

768 of 12/08/21. This log relates to a shooting in Plymouth and he accessed it in contravention of the Force Data Protection Policy.

6.15    The evidence is clear that SS Lafferty had no relevant policing role in respect of this incident. It was a highly newsworthy incident. The suggestion by SS Lafferty that he had been contacted to consider Special Constable resources is undermined by the fact that no message to this effect has been found on any system. If it existed it should be recoverable. The only message is the ‘Whatsapp’ message at page 204 on 12^th August 2021 at 20:38. The system’s accesses occur both before and after the timing of that message which is clear that resources are not required. 

6.16    The panel find that SS Lafferty:

1. i) Accessed the relevant logs,
2. ii) He had no legitimate policing purpose for so doing
3. iii) The activity was contrary to the D&C Force Data Policy. Throughout and in particular Para 3.6.1 (at page 249)

6.17  The allegation is proved.

7 PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS:

The panel have gone on to consider if the facts found proved amount to breaches of any standards of professional behaviour on behalf of SS Lafferty:

7.1

1. (i) Duties and Responsibilities: Police officers are diligent in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities.
2. (ii) Confidentiality: Police officers treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the proper course of police duties.
3. (iii) Discreditable conduct, you behaved in a manner, which would discredit the police service and undermine public confidence in the police by accessing personal data which related to members of the public without a police purpose.

7.2 The panel find that there have been breaches of professional standards of :

1. i) Duties and Responsibilities ,
2. ii) Confidentiality,
3. iii) Discreditable conduct

8 LEVEL

At what level do we find these breaches to have occurred?

8.1  In short summary, the panel has found that whilst there is no evidence that SS Lafferty acted on or divulged the information, nor any attempts to conceal his activity, he illegitimately obtained the information, his actions amount to a significant and serious breach of confidentiality and trust between the public and the police. The accesses are numerous, they occur over a significant period of time. SS Lafferty was in a leadership role.

8.2 The data held is at times particularly sensitive and embarrassing in nature, covering areas such as rape, and sexual allegations with young victims and even a young suspect, sudden deaths and firearms matters to name just a few.

8.3 The activity was clearly contrary to force policies, and it should have been obvious to SS Lafferty that they were.

8.4 Members of the public who need to report matters to the police or engage with them must be able to do so without fear that their extremely sensitive data is not being shared beyond those necessary to deal with the case in hand. The public would undoubtedly be appalled that people unconnected to the case viewed their personal data.

8.5 Having applied the definition in section 2 Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 the panel find that SS Lafferty’s actions amount to ‘gross misconduct’ being:

“… a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify dismissal”.

OUTCOME

1 This document should be read in conjunction with the panel’s Decision document.

2 We have followed the guidance contained in the ‘Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings’. We have taken into account para 1.5 that the guidance does not override the discretion of the panel whose function it is to determine the appropriate outcome, dependant on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. We have used the guidance as a general framework for assessing the conduct.

3 Throughout, we have had firmly in mind that the purposes of the police misconduct regime is threefold:

1. Maintain public confidence, in and the reputation of the police service.
2. Uphold high standards in policing and deter misconduct.
3. Protect the public.

4         

1. i) We have assessed the seriousness of the misconduct,
2. ii) We have borne in mind the purpose of imposing sanctions
3. iii)We have chosen the sanction which most appropriately fulfils that purpose for the seriousness of the conduct in question, having considered least severe sanctions before more severe.

 

5 When assessing the seriousness of the conduct we have considered:

1. Culpability,
2. Harm and/or potential for harm,
3. Aggravating factors,
4. Mitigating factors.

Then gone onto consider;

1. Personal mitigation.

6 Culpability (list):

1. i) Activity over an extended period of time,
2. ii) Numerous occasions when carried out.
3. iii) Had been suitably trained in force policies. The activity was intentional.
4. v) In a leadership role.
5. vi) Data Protection and Misuse of particularly sensitive data involved (see Guidance       on Outcomes para 4.34-4.37).

We find culpability to be high.  

7 Harm:

1. i) Potential breach of public’s trust as to how data is handled by the police.
2. ii) Great potential for reputational harm .
3. iii) Potential to undermine public confidence in coming forward to engage with the police.
4. iv) Extreme sensitivity in some of the data.
5. v) Breach of the public’s right to a private life (Art 8 ECHH) (relates to the subjects of the data).
6. vi) Multiple victims.
7. vii) Vulnerability of victims.

Harm is found to be at a high level.

8 The panel has not double accounted by adding aggravating factors already, taken into account in deciding culpability and harm.

9 No misconduct based mitigating factors are present save that the misconduct did not involve dissemination of the information, nor acting on it for personal gain.

10 Personal mitigation:

1. i) Special Sergeant Lafferty was a long serving volunteer in this important civic role.
2. ii) His previous conduct was exemplary, and he properly received recognition and awards for that.
3. iii) There is evidence in the form of a testimonial as to his good character.
4. iv) He has resigned his position already.

11 OUTCOME:

The panel has decided that the appropriate, proportionate outcome is that if SS Lafferty remained a serving officer he would be dismissed.

David Sapiecha, LQC.

Supt Emma Butler-Jones

Christopher Kennedy, Independent Member

5^th July 2023.

 

[1] Unless otherwise stated references to Regulations are to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020.

[2] P27 to 34 including the email of 21/5/23 and character reference at page 29.

[3] P199-200.

[4] P202 and P205

[5] S31 Response at page 27.

[6] P199

[7] At page 191.

[8] P28 Response- although at Page 199 he said  “ he looked at the log because it involved               ”.

[9] At page 249.