Former PC Steven Athawes
IN THE MATTER OF
POLICE (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020
BETWEEN:
The Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall Police
Appropriate Authority
And
Respondent
Former PC 17344 Steven Athawes
DECISION OF THE PANEL
APPROACH:
1. We are a panel considering allegations of gross misconduct against the above officer.
2. We have considered all of the evidence. All panel members have read the bundle provided to us before the hearing. We have taken into account all documents to which we have been referred. We have also considered all the submissions made on behalf of each party.
3. In approaching our tasks we have borne in mind that:
3.1. We do not have to decide every matter of dispute, only those which assist us as to whether these allegations are proved.
3.2. We can draw inferences from the evidence submitted to us, meaning we can reach common sense conclusions from the evidence, but we have guarded against falling into speculation when reaching those conclusions.
3.3. Inevitably our findings are set out sequentially however we have not made any finding of fact without having first considered the entire evidential matrix.
PURPOSE OF POLICE MISCONDUCT PROCEEDINGS
4. The applicable regulations are the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (“PCR”). We are helpfully reminded by the AA of some of the relevant caselaw in the opening note submitted to us.
5.1 The approach of the Panel as set out in the PCR is:
a) To ascertain the facts, whether admitted or found proven.
b) To determine whether, on the basis of those facts, the former officer have breached the SPB alleged.
c) To decide whether any such breaches constitute Misconduct, Gross Misconduct or neither.
d) Dependent on the findings under b) and c), to decide on the Outcome.
BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF
6.1 The burden of proof is on the A.A.
6.2 The standard of proof is at S.9 Home Office Guidelines p193.
6.3 The allegations are as set out in the Regulation 30 Notices contained within the bundle. It is set out for us in the opening note and is set out below.
Allegation 1:
Whilst on duty on 30th / 31st May 2021, PC Athawes had planned to collect an off-duty female officer and therefore has neglected his duties.
Allegation 2:
Having collected this off-duty female officer, he has had sexual encounters in the back of a police van with her.
Allegation 3:
PC Athawes had informed his supervisor and crew mate that he was on a medication run, when he was in fact collecting the off-duty police officer in a marked police van.
This is a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour, namely;
Discreditable Conduct
Police officers behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence in it, whether on or off duty.
Honesty and Integrity
Police officers are honest, act with integrity and do not compromise or abuse their position.
Authority, Respect and Courtesy
Police officers act with self-control and tolerance, treating members of the public and colleagues with respect and courtesy.
Police officers ensure that any relationship at work does not create an actual or apparent conflict of interest and do not engage in sexual conduct or other inappropriate behaviour when on duty.
Duties and Responsibilities
Police officers are diligent in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities.
It is considered that this conduct amounts to gross misconduct.
Stage 1. The Facts.
7.1 The burden of proving these allegations rests on the Appropriate Authority. The standard by which they are required to prove the allegations is the balance of probabilities (the appropriate standard). We have considered the Home Office Guidance 2018.
7.2 The panel has considered the allegations carefully. We have first ascertained the facts as we find them considering the burden and standard of proof. Then we have considered those facts as against the standards required under the Regulations.
THE EVIDENCE:
8.1 We then turn to the evidence heard by the panel. We observe that neither of the accused officers in this case has taken part in the hearing of this matter. Both officers have now resigned from the Police Service. PC Athawes did submit a regulation 31 response which we have considered. Thereafter he confirmed that he had no wish to engage further with the disciplinary process and that he sought no further assistance from the Police Federation. As a consequence at the final hearing of the allegations we received no oral evidence from the officer or from any witnesses on his behalf.
8.2 At the heart of the allegations in this case is the simple allegation that whilst on duty PC Athawes dropped of the officer with whom he had been paired for his duties, he then used a police vehicle to collect an off duty colleague who was on a night out in Exeter. Having done so he drove to a secluded spot and a sexual encounter occurred within the rear of the vehicle. During this process PC Athawes reported to his supervising sergeant that he was undertaking a “medication run”, that is said to be a lie told to conceal his true actions in collecting PC Krolewicz for their liaison.
8.3 Large parts of the circumstances surrounding the allegations are not disputed. The regulation 31 response accepts that the officer was on duty at the alleged time. It is further accepted that on the night concerned the officer was at times single crewed. The officer accepts that he collected an off-duty colleague PC Krolewicz from the city centre, she was with two of her friends on a night out at the time. The officer’s response further accepts that whilst single crewed he went in the police vehicle that he was driving to two locations away from the city centre, a car park at the top of Pennsylvania Road and a church yard close to Lancelot Road. PC Athawes accepts that having collected the three people from Exeter city centre, he took them to Lancelot Road.
8.4 PC Athawes denies any sexual encounter with PC Krolewicz during the evening, and also denies the suggestion that he told his sergeant that he was undertaking a medication run as cover for his liaison.
8.5 The panel heard oral evidence from a colleague. Their evidence is of potential significance because they were a colleague of PC Krolewicz and they gave an account of things they were told by PC Krolewicz concerning the alleged misconduct. It is clear that PC Athawes disputed the account of the colleague in his regulation 31 response and that PC Krolewicz also appeared to contest the colleague’s recollection in the written answers that they did provide in the earlier stages of the investigation.
8.6 We evaluated the evidence of the colleague in the context of all other evidence and submissions made to us. We noted that the oral evidence heard was consistent with the signed witness statement provided by the officer. We were impressed by the clarity of the officer’s evidence. The officer also accepted that they were casting their mind back some way in time and was frank as to what they could and could not recollect. At no stage did they purport to have an absolute and complete recollection of all details and it was clear to us as a panel that they did all that they possibly could to give a reliable and accurate account. It was also clear to us that the officer was in no doubt as to some important elements of their recollections. We found them to be a credible, cogent and reliable witness whose evidence we accept in its entirety.
8.7 It is of particular significance in our opinion that the colleague has a clear recollection of a number of matters. The first is that PC Krolewicz had shown to them messages sent to them by PC Athawes, these were sexually flirtatious in nature. They went on to recall being made aware by PC Krolewicz of a longer text sent to them by PC Athawes setting out in some detail the sexual acts that he would like to perform with PC Krolewicz. That exchange was followed by a recollection of a comment made by PC Krolewicz, when asked how she felt about PC Athawes, the colleague recalled PC Krolewicz replied that “a dick is a dick”.
8.8 We find that the recollection of such a distinctive comment, in the context of a discussion about sexualised text messages is not a recollection that has been fabricated. We find the comment to be corroborative of the sexual nature of the text messages received by PC Krolewicz from PC Athawes. We find as a fact that such sexualised messaging was occurring prior to the alleged misconduct.
8.9 The colleague went on in their evidence to say that subsequently on or around the 17th of June 2021, they were asked by PC Krolewicz to speak with in a locker room where they could speak privately. When alone the colleague asked if the conversation would be about PC Athawes, and PC Krolewicz stated that it was. We find that that enquiry by the colleague supports the contention that there had been previous disclosure to her concerning sexualised interaction with PC Athawes, hence her enquiry to PC Krolewicz.
8.10 The colleague then asked PC Krolewicz if she had had sex with PC Athawes, they stated that PC Krolewicz replied that they had not had sex but that they had done everything else. She said that they had, “done stuff in a vehicle” but didn’t go into detail. PC Krolewicz went on to say that on the night of the allegations PC Athawes had been alone driving the police riot van. He had collected her when she asked for a lift and they were alone in the back of the van. PC Krolewicz recalls PC Athawes as saying over the radio that he was collecting medication. PC Krolewicz herself told the colleague that she had told PC Athawes that that was a stupid reply because it was the middle of the night and it was not clear who would require any medication to be collected.
8.11 PC Krolewicz further disclosed that PC Athawes’ radio was operating so frequently that they were unable to have sex. We observe that on a late night duty concerning the night time economy and having seen other communication evidence before us that is an entirely credible assertion. PC Krolewicz gave further particular details of the fact that when alone in the back of the police van PC Athawes was encumbered by the kit that he was wearing but PC Krolewicz had “her legs open”.
8.12 It has been necessary to set out in some detail the recollections given to us. That is important because in the context of a dispute as to the accuracy of the colleague’s recollection, we note the matters of detail and unusual features that were related to her concerning this sexual encounter. There is no evidence at all before us to suggest that the colleague would have any interest in giving anything other than an accurate recollection of what they were told. There is before us no reason whatsoever for them to have made up or imagined any of these assertions. Applying as we must the balance of probabilities as a standard of proof we are satisfied that we can accept the colleague’s recollections in their entirety and we make findings of fact to reflect them.
8.13 We find that PC Krolewicz made these disclosures to the colleague because the incidents in question had occurred. Sexualised text messages were sent to PC Krolewicz and matters developed to the point that when alone in a police vehicle she and PC Athawes had a sexual encounter that was interrupted by his duties.
8.14 At this point we turn to a further aspect of the allegations. PC Athawes accepts that he was single crewed when he collected PC Krolewicz and her friends. We have watched body worn video footage served. This covered a period when PC Athawes was in company with a crewmate having attended a domestic incident. Whilst driving the police vehicle to hospital PC Athawes, looks at his watch and states that “it’s a bit annoying because I have a mission of mercy”. The crewmate is heard to say “Daria?” Daria is the first name of PC Krolewicz. PC Athawes replies, “Might be, I’ll sort something out”. About 30 mins later on some footage taken at hospital, PC Athawes states to his crewmate, “once we are done here I’ll drop you off at the nick and I can go and do my quick mission”.
8.15 We find from those comments that PC Athawes was planning to meet PC Krolewicz and intended to drop off his colleague at the police station so that he could meet her alone. We note an apparent coyness with his colleague as to the purpose of the meeting and an absence of any suggestion that medication was to be collected.
8.16 That evidence sits alongside the evidence of another colleague, they set out for us the division of duties on the evening in question and that is not subject to any factual dispute. They clarified that on the duty with which we were concerned PC Athawes was the only officer qualified to drive the large police van that was being deployed. Later in the evening the colleague became aware that his crewmate was alone in his office at the police station as a consequence he called PC Athawes by point to point, he recalls that in that call the officer told him that, “he was getting medication”. We note that that evidence is corroborated by the disclosure made to the colleague by PC Krolewicz. We find as a fact that when alone in the police vehicle PC Athawes told his colleague that he was engaged in a medication run.
8.17 There is no adequate evidence before us of any such medication run and we find as a fact that PC Athawes lied to his sergeant when claiming to be engaged on such a trip. We have already found that he had a sexual encounter in the police vehicle with PC Krolewicz, and we also find that he told a lie to his sergeant in order to facilitate the opportunity for that liaison.
8.18 It is accepted by PC Athawes that he visited the car park and church yard mentioned above in this decision. PC Athawes stated in his response that he attended the car park in order to patrol for illegal activity, he asserted that it was a venue known for such illegal activity. We have received evidence based upon a search of police intelligence from an officer, we do not find that the car park in question has any such established profile for illegal activity, and we find that the officer in fact went to that secluded location for the purposes of a sexual encounter. We find from the disclosure made by PC Krolewicz that radio activity interrupted their encounter and it is clear from the accepted movements of the vehicle that the van then returned to the city centre. Thereafter the police vehicle went to the churchyard before returning to Lancelot Road for a second time. We note the explanation given by PC Athawes that he wished to have a rest and then made a welfare check on the people he had taken to Lancelot Road. However on the entirety of the evidence we have heard and in the light of the earlier interruption to their liaison we are satisfied and find that the police vehicle was taken to the church yard in order to continue the sexual liaison. Thereafter the return to Lancelot Road was in order to take PC Krolewicz back to that address.
8.19 With regret we are bound to conclude and observe that we find the regulation 31 notice provided by PC Athawes, to have been an unreliable account aimed at avoiding the consequences of his actions.
8.20 We have considered whether or not PC Athawes told a lie to his colleague. The comment heard by his crewmate and prompting him to ask whether a mission concerned Daria causes us to believe that he may have known that his colleague was meeting PC Krolewicz. We do not find that he was aware of any planned sexual encounter but we are not persuaded to find that PC Athawes was dishonest in his interactions with crewmate if in fact he knew broadly that PC Athawes was going to meet PC Krolewicz.
8.21 As was set out above it has not been necessary for us to resolve all factual events and to produce an entire chronology of all events that night. However the facts that we have found above allow us to then consider the allegations made against this officer.
8.22 We find that allegation 1 is made out, the officer did plan to collect PC Krolewicz when she was off duty and in doing so he took himself away from his duties that evening. There was no policing purpose for his action.
8.23 In respect of allegation 2 we are satisfied that a sexual encounter occurred with PC Krolewicz in the marked police vehicle whilst PC Athawes was on duty.
8.24 In respect of allegation 3 we are persuaded that the officer told a lie to a colleague when claiming to be attending to a medication collection. That dishonesty whilst on duty was perpetrated in order to continue the sexual liaison referred to above.
8.25 Turning to the alleged breaches of standards of professional behaviour we make the following findings. Discreditable conduct has occurred because this officer has used an opportunity during his duties, and a police vehicle to serve his own sexual appetite whilst on duty. His decision to do so whilst on duty and whilst using a police vehicle that would have been required during a busy night time economy posting, is discreditable and will undoubtedly undermine public confidence in the Police.
8.26 The officer has been responsible for a dishonest explanation to his sergeant, he has failed to act with integrity by lying as to his actions and concealing his true activity. His dishonesty has also allowed him to be able to continue to neglect his duties.
8.27 The officer has failed to act with self control and with appropriate respect for a colleague in that he has been unable to wait until the end of his duties before having a sexual encounter and he has not shown appropriate respect for his professional colleagues by stepping away from his duties and lying as to his reasons for doing so. We also note that Home Office guidance on this issue indicates that officers must ensure that any relationship at work does not create an actual or apparent conflict of interest and must not engage in sexual conduct whilst on duty. The officer in this case has had no regard to that guidance and has engaged in sexual conduct whilst on duty.
8.28 Finally the officer has failed to be diligent in the execution of his duty in that he has removed himself from his duties and in doing so has deprived his colleagues not only of his assistance but also of access to the only large police van and driver that was available to them during a busy night time tour of duty. By driving as he did to two secluded locations some distance away from the city centre the officer’s actions have also increased levels of risk to members of the public because he has taken both himself and an important police vehicle further from any city centre venues at which it may need to be deployed. His actions meant that the vehicle could not be deployed with any immediacy because he had taken it away from the city centre.
8.29 We look at these individual findings that we have reached and do not hesitate in concluding that collectively this officer’s misconduct must be categorised as gross misconduct. His dishonesty, his willingness to avoid his duties as an officer, his decision to have a sexual encounter within a police vehicle are all actions that required planning and manipulation of colleagues. He removed policing resources from the tour of duty, enhancing the potential for risk to the public and colleagues. In those circumstances we do not hesitate to find that the misconduct in this case is so serious as to justify dismissal accordingly we consider that the Appropriate Authority have persuaded us that the breaches in this case represent gross misconduct.
OUTCOME
8.30 Having determined that the breaches of professional standards taken collectively constituted Gross Misconduct, the panel must go on to decide what the disciplinary action should be.
8.31 The panel had been assisted by submissions on the question of outcome, and having heard representations, the panel then considered the appropriate outcome.
8.32 In determining the appropriate disciplinary action in this case, the panel has had regard to the College of Policing’s Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings (2022) (“the guidance”) including the need to :
a) assess the seriousness of the misconduct by reference to:
1. the officer’s culpability for the misconduct;
2. the harm caused by the misconduct;
3. the existence of any aggravating factors;
4. the existence of any mitigating factors;
b) keeping in mind the purpose of imposing disciplinary action; and
c) choosing the disciplinary action which most appropriately fulfils that purpose for the seriousness of the conduct in question so that we act proportionately.
8.33 The Panel was also mindful of the principles set out in R (Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police) v Police Misconduct Panel & Roscoe (HHJ Pelling QC sitting as a High Court Judge, November 2018) in which the Administrative Court emphasises the importance of following the structured 3 stage approach as set out in the aforementioned guidance. The Panel adopted this approach.
8.34 With respect to seriousness, the Panel considered the 2022 Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings.
Culpability
8.35 This refers to the degree of blameworthiness. PC Athawes is culpable for his own actions, he made deliberate choices in the actions he undertook whilst on duty, he also had a number of opportunities to cease the arrangements for contact with PC Krolewicz, but instead persisted. His actions also involved deliberate dishonesty to his acting Sergeant.
Harm
8.36 It is clear that the actions in this case resulted in an officer being unavailable for duties during his shift. Furthermore a police vehicle, the only one of its type available during the shift, was not available for significant periods. As a consequence the actions of the officer increased the risk to fellow officers and members of the public by reducing the policing efficiency of the police service during the period of the officer’s actions.
8.37 The further aspect of harm caused in this case is that of the reputational harm to the Devon and Cornwall Police. The present case cannot be considered in isolation from increasing public awareness of disciplinary issues within the police service, and as a consequence the reputational harm to any police force within which a serving officer is found to have absconded from his duties in order to enjoy a sexual liaison in a police vehicle, will inevitably be serious and damaging.
8.38 As was stated in the case of Fuglers LLP V SRA [2014] EWHC 179 (Admin) at [29] a factor of the greatest importance is the impact of the misconduct upon the standing and reputation of the profession as a whole. Moreover, the seriousness of the misconduct may lie in the risk of harm to which the misconduct gives rise, whether or not as things turn out, the risk eventuates.
8.39 From the observations above the panel are clear that the actions of the officer have caused a risk of serious and enduring harm to the reputation of the police service. There is also as set out above an enhanced risk of harm to members of the public and colleagues by abrogating his duties in the way that we have found to have occurred.
Aggravating factors:
8.40 The panel has kept in mind that though there have been several heads of professional behaviour that have been breached, we are concerned with a single incident and there will be no double accounting in our assessment of harm and application of principles dictating the outcome.
8.41 We do not find any aggravating features in this case beyond those features of the incident that have already been dealt with above. We guard against any double accounting.
Mitigating factors:
8.42 The mitigating factors taken into account on PC Athawes’ behalf are clear. He is an officer with a previously good service record. It is clear that in other respects PC Athawes was an individual who has demonstrated commitment to training and service.
8.43 We have also noted and recognise that these proceedings have undoubtedly had a significant impact on PC Athawes.
8.44 With respect to the purpose of imposing disciplinary action in police misconduct proceedings:
a) The primary purpose is to protect the public confidence in and the reputation of policing;
b) The second purpose is the declaratory purpose of maintaining high professional standards by demonstrating to other officers that misconduct of a certain kind and/or a certain seriousness will be dealt with by disciplinary action of a certain severity; and
c) The third purpose is to protect the public and/or officers and staff by preventing the officer from committing similar misconduct again by excluding them from the police service.
8.45 In Redgrave v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2003] 1 WLR 1136 Simon Brown LJ (as he then was) at [33] approved the following dictum of Lord Diplock in Ziderman v General Dental Council [1976] 2 All ER 334 atp.336: 72
“The purpose of disciplinary proceedings against a person convicted of crime is not to punish him a second time for the same offence but to protect the public who come to him as patients and to maintain the high standards and good reputation of an honourable profession”. (emphasis added)
8.46. In R (Green) v Police Complaints Authority [2004] UKHL 6; [2004] 1 WLR 725, Lord Carswell stated at [78]:
“Public confidence in the police is a factor of great importance in the maintenance of law and order in the manner which we regard as appropriate in our polity. If citizens feel that improper behaviour on the part of police officers is left unchecked and they are not held accountable for it in a suitable manner, that confidence will be eroded.”
8.46 Lord Bingham (when Master of the Rolls) had previously made the same point in relation to the solicitors’ profession in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR.
8.47 In explaining the apparent harshness of sanctions imposed by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal he identified the purpose of such sanctions and said at p.518H (emphasis added):
“The second purpose is the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the solicitors' profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth. To maintain this reputation and sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not only expelled but denied re-admission. If a member of the public sells his house, very often his largest asset, and entrusts the proceeds to his solicitor, pending re- investment in another house, he is ordinarily entitled to expect that the solicitor will be a person whose trustworthiness is not, and never has been, seriously in question. Otherwise, the whole profession, and the public as a whole, is injured. A profession's most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires.”
8.48 In Salter v Chief Constable of Dorset Police [2012] EWCA Civ 2012, Maurice Kay LJ found that it was appropriate to draw an analogy between police officers and legal professionals at [21] (emphasis added):
“Although police officers do not have a fiduciary client relationship with individual members of the public or the public at large, they do carry out vital public functions in which it is imperative that the public have confidence in them. It is also obvious that the operational dishonesty or impropriety of a single officer tarnishes the reputation of his Force and undermines public confidence in it. In these respects, the similarities between solicitors and police officers justify the analogy provided that, ultimately, the decision- maker, be it the PAT or a judge of the Administrative Court, appreciates at all times that the index case falls to be assessed in the context of policing.”
8.49 In R (Coke- Wallis) V Institute of Chartered Accountants [2011] UKSC 1 at [60] Lord Collins reaffirmed the purpose of professional disciplinary proceedings to be: (....to protect the public, to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the profession and to uphold proper standards of behaviour: see Bolton V Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512, 518 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR; Gupta V General Medical Council [2002] 1 WLR 1691, para 21, per Lord Roger of Earlsferry.
8.50 The Panel commends the actions of all the police officers in this case who raised concerns and took action. It was their duty to do so but such duties are not always easy to discharge.
8.51 The primary purpose of imposing disciplinary sanctions in police misconduct proceedings is to protect the public confidence in and the reputation of policing. The second purpose is the declaratory purpose of maintaining high professional standard by demonstrating to other officers that misconduct of a certain kind and/or a certain seriousness will be dealt with by disciplinary action of a certain severity. The maintenance of public confidence and so that the public understand that such conduct will be treated with a severe outcome. The way to restore public confidence is to make sure that due process is followed and that an appropriately severe outcome follows.
8.52 The Panel has had regard to PC Athawes’ record of service and personal mitigation. Personal mitigation is important and must be taken into account. However the decisions above give clear guidance on the limited weight to be given to personal mitigation (as opposed to conduct mitigation) in professional disciplinary proceedings in general and police misconduct hearings in particular.
8.53 In Bolton Sir Thomas Bingham MR explained why personal mitigation carried less weight in the professional disciplinary context than the criminal context at p.519B-D
“Because orders made by the Tribunal are not primarily punitive, it follows that considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect on the exercise of this jurisdiction than on the ordinary run of sentences imposed in criminal cases. It often happens that a solicitor appearing before the tribunal can adduce a wealth of glowing tributes from his professional brethren. He can often show that for him and his family the consequences of striking off or suspension would be little short of tragic. Often, he will say, convincingly, that he has learned his lesson and will not offend again. On applying for restoration after striking off, all these points may be made, and the former solicitor may also be able to point to real efforts made to re-establish himself and redeem his reputation. All these matters are relevant and should be considered. But none of them touches the essential issue, which is the need to maintain among members of the public a well- founded confidence that any solicitor whom they instruct will be a person of unquestionable integrity, probity and trustworthiness.”
8.54 In Salter in the Court of Appeal, Maurice Kay LJ said at [23]:
“As to personal mitigation, just as an unexpectedly errant solicitor can usually refer to an unblemished past and the esteem of his colleagues, so will a police officer often be able so to do. However, because of the importance of public confidence, the potential of such mitigation is necessarily limited.”
8.55 In R (Williams) v PAT [2016] EWHC 2708 (Admin), Holroyde J confirmed that the approach to mitigation in Salter was not restricted to cases of honesty and integrity. Holroyde J also gave the following general guidance on how the question of mitigation should be approached in police misconduct cases:
“In my judgment the importance of maintaining public confidence in and respect for the police service is constant, regardless of the nature of the gross misconduct under consideration. What may vary will be the extent to which the particular gross misconduct threatens the preservation of such confidence and respect. The more it does so, the less weight can be given to personal mitigation. Gross misconduct involving dishonesty or lack of integrity will by its very nature be a serious threat: save perhaps in wholly exceptional circumstances, the public could have no confidence in a police force which allowed a convicted fraudster to continue in service. Gross misconduct involving a lack of integrity will often also be a serious threat. But other forms of gross misconduct may also pose a serious threat, and breach of any of the Standards may be capable of causing great harm to the public's confidence in and respect for the police.
This does not mean, of course, that personal mitigation is to be ignored. Nothing in the Salter principle suggests it must be ignored. On the contrary, it must always be taken into account...”
8.56 In conclusion, the panel must take account of the officer’s personal mitigation, but the weight to be accorded to that mitigation:
a) is less than it would be in a criminal trial; and
b) is dependent upon the extent to which the officer’s misconduct threatens the public confidence.
8.57 Having followed the steps above, the panel went on to choose the disciplinary action which most appropriately fulfils the purpose of imposing disciplinary action considering the seriousness of the conduct in question (bearing in mind the need to act proportionately).
8.58 The Panel went on to consider all of the available outcomes, starting with the least serious. The Panel considered that a final written warning was not a sufficient outcome in this case. The considerable personal mitigation for this officer is obvious but as set out in the authorities recited above, the primary duty of the panel is to protect the public confidence that must be held in a police force. The panel do not consider that such confidence would be upheld by the imposition of a final written warning.
8.59 Similarly any possible reduction in rank would not assist in the present case and the panel have formed the view that the continued presence of this officer within a policing force when he has acted as we have found, will inevitably serve to reduce public confidence that the police force acts appropriately and decisively in the face of any such behaviour as we have found.
8.60 The consequence of our analysis is that the panel are of the view that only dismissal without notice can be seen as an appropriate outcome. We reach that view with some regret because this officer has given service that has previously been to a high standard. However the public in our view will not tolerate a police force that continues to accommodate officers who have behaved as we have found to have occurred.
8.61 Former PC Athawes has of course already resigned from his service, we have conducted an analysis above as if he was still within service however his resignation has the consequence that the panel has a simple choice, we may impose disciplinary action or choose to impose no disciplinary action. For the reasons set out above we find disciplinary action to be necessary and the only such action available to us is to find that the former officer would have been dismissed if he had still been a member of a police force.
Signature: Mr Deni Mathews
LEGALLY QUALIFIED CHAIR
Date: 15th March 2023
Signature: Supt Louise Costin
POLICE PANEL MEMBER
Date: 15th March 2023
Signature: Ms Jennifer MacDonald
INDEPENDENT PANEL MEMBER
Date: 15th March 2023